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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, et al, and EMPIRE ELECTRIC
ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,
Defendants.

Case
No.
12042

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant, Empire Electric Association, Inc.,
filed an application with the Public Service Commission of Utah to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity permitting said defendant to operate as a public utility supplying electric service in
an area of San Juan County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The Public Service Commission of Utah granted defendant, Empire Electric Association, Inc., Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1682 authorizing it to operate as a public utility rendering

1

electric se1·vice in an area of Sa11 Juan County, Utah,
the boundaries of which area were established by
the Commission, and said Certificate was made subject to the conditions and limitations contained in
the franchise granted by said County to said defendant.
Petition for Rehearing and Reconsideration was
timely filed by plaintiff and said Petition was denied
by the Commission without hearing thereon.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal seeks to have the lawfulness of the
Report and Order of the Commission inquired into
and determined and that this Honorable Court
thereupon enter its Order setting aside and nullifying said Report and Order.
PRELIMINARY MA TIERS
For purposes of brevity in this brief the plaintiff, Utah Power & Light Company, will be referred
to as "Utah Power"; defendant, Public Service
Commission of Utah, et al., as "Commission"; and
defendant, Empire Electric Association, Inc., as "Empire". Reference to the record of the proceedings
will be CR.
).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June of 1969 Empire filed an application
with the Commission for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity permitting it to operate as a pub2

lie utility in a described area of San Juan County,
Utah. Utah Power filed a protest to said application.
Hearing on the application commenced on September 3, 1969 and continued at various intervals
thereafter until conclusion on October 1, 1969. The
parties thereafter filed briefs and on January 12,
1970 the Commission issued its Report and Order.
Empire presented a number of witnesses and
introduced Exhibits 1 through 23 in support of its
application. Empire is a Colorado corporation duly
qualified to engage in business in the State of Utah.
It is an "electrical corporation" and a "public utility" as those terms are defined in Chapter 2, Title
54, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and
as such its business within the State of Utah is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Empire for a number of years has furnished
electric service to its members in portions of San
Juan County, Utah and for that purpose has established and maintained an electrical system in said
County. Empire furnishes electrical service only to
its members in San Juan County pursuant to a right.of-way easement granted in April of 1955 by San
Juan County. Said document, Exhibit 5, (R. 315),
construed by the Commission as a "franchise" (R.
444), authorized Empire to erect and maintain upon
the public highways such poles and wires as may
be necessary to enable it to supply electric power
to "its member-consumers within said County of San
3

Juan.'' The testimony of Empire's manager
terson, was that Empire's electric serv;
County is supplied only to its member-(
(R. 181).

he uli()ll Ul
it\\''

Empire presented evidence relative t<
electrical system, power supply, financial st .ms, and
the need for electric service by its member-consumers.
J

Utah Power, in support of its protest to the application, presented testimony of several witnesses
and introduced Exhibits 24 through 32.
Utah Power's Exhibit 27 CR. 394), is an ordinance from San Juan County dated January 13, 1955
granting to Utah Power a county-wide franchise
for a period of fifty ( 50) years to construct, maintain and operate on present and future roads, highways and public places in San Juan County, electric light and power lines and necessary appurtenances "for the purpose of transmitting and supplying electricity to said County, the inhabitants thereof, and persons and corporations beyond the limits
thereof, for light, heat, power and other purposes".
Utah Power's Exhibit 28 CR. 395) is an Order
of the Commission dated April 28, 1955 granting
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1118
to Utah Power "to exercise the rights and privileges
conferred by franchise ordinance dated January 13,
1955, p;ranted by San Juan County, Utah". Exhi4

1 '
1•
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3C) 7 ! represent;, the investmen i made by
·er in San Juan County in electrical facilitpply service to consumers in said County
to said franchise and Certificate of Conand Necessity.

'.

Su._ ;equent to the closing of the record and submission of written briefs, the Commission on January 12, 1970 issued its Report and Order CR. 441)
which granted a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to Empire. Said Certificate was made subject
to the, conditions and limitations contained in the
San Juan County franchise (one such limitation being thl urnishing of electric service only to member-consumers) and was further limited to the described area established by the Commission and set
forth in such Report and Order. The Report and Order contained further language relative to Utah Power's existing authority in San Juan County and imposed certain requirements upon Utah Power in the
future exercise of such authority.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND
ORDER IS ERRONEOUS, UNLAWFUL AND
ARBITRARY IN THAT THE COMMISSION
HAS MADE A DETERMINATION THEREIN OF AN ISSUE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
IT IN THE INSTANT PROCEEDING.
The subject hearing before the Commission was
held pursuant to an application filed by Empire for
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a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. Te ultimate issue to be determined by Lhe ComnussH1 in
such hearing was whether or Hot the applican w as
elltitled to the authority sought.
The Commission's Heport and Order, in addition
to determining that the applicant was entitled to a
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, proceeded
beyond that point to restrict, limit and modify plaintiff's existing authority to operate as an electrical public utility in San Juan County, even in those areas
not involved in Empire's application.
The Commission's Report and Order stated that
plaintiff's Exhibits 27 and 28 "'shows that Utah Po\Yer is presently certificated to provide electric service
in all of San Juan County pursuant to a franchise
granted by said County on January 19, 1955 for a
period of -30 years." ( R. 448 l. The Report and Order
then states: CR. 448).
"But said franchise merely permits Utah Power to construct, maintain and operate its lines
along and across the roads, highways, and public places of San Juan County for the purpose
of transmitting and supplying electricity to
the County, its residents, and persons and corporations beyond the limits thereof. The certificate of Utah Power CNo. 1118 issued April
28, 1955) thus limited by these purposes, constitutes no authority to operate as a public utility throughout the entire county of San Juan .
particularly in areas involving other electric
utility and municipal utiHties operations. It
merely authorizes Utah Power & Light Com6

pany to use the county's streets and public
ways for the construction and operation of its
utility system."
Following this c.onstruction of plaintiff's existing- franchise and certificate, the Report and Order
rontained the following language: CR. 449)
"If protestant, Utah Power, now seeks to serve
San Juan County after having failed to serve
it at least in the portions for which Empire
seeks certification, it cannot assume such a
position unless Utah Power obtains from this
Commission a certificate indicating that the
public convenience and necessity warrants
the granting of this additional authority."

The conclusion to be reached from the foregoing language is that although plaintiff has been
duly certifirnted since 1955 to supply electric service to consumers of San Juan County and pursuant
thereto has supplied such service and has made the
necessary investment in dedicated facilities to do
so, it cannot now render service in said County without obtaining from the Commission the additional
authority of another Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity.
Plaintiff's franchise from San Juan County

CR. 315, Exhibit 27) provides in Section 1 thereof

as follows:

"That there is hereby granted to Utah Power
& Light Company, its successors and assigns
(herein called the "Grantee"), the right, priv7

ilege, or franchise until January 12, :2005, to
construct, maintain and operate in, along
and across the present and future roads, highways, and public places in San Juan County,
and its successors, over which said Board of
County Commissioners has authority, electric
light and power lines, together with all the
necessary or desirable appurtenances \ including underground conduits, poles, towers,
wires, transmission lines, and telegraph and
telephone lines for its own use), for the purpose of transmittin{!: and supplying electricity
to said County, the inhabitants thereof, and
persons and corporations beyond the limits
thereof, for light, heat, power and other purposes." (Emphasis added.)
Certificate of Convenience an<l Necessity No.
1118 rn. '.N·"5, Exhibit 28 l, granted to plaintiff by
the Commission, provi<les in part as follows:
''IT IS ORDERED, That Utah Power & Light
Company be and is hereby granted Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1118 authorizing it to exercise the rights and privileges conferred by franchise ordinance dated
.January 13, 1955, granted by San Juan County, Utah."
Sai<l franchise an<l said certifirate are unrestricted in scope and do not impose any conditions
on plaintiff's right and obligation to supply electric service to consumers in San .Tuan County. The
language above quoted from the Commission's Report and Order. hovvever. disregards plaintiff's
rights inherent in such franchise and certificate and
now r<'<iuire that the future 0xercise of same
8

\'.here in San Juan County is contingent upon obtaining additional authority from the Commission.
The effect of such interpretation by the Commission
on plaintiff's existing certificated authority in San
Juan County is to decertificate plaintiff in such County and invalidate Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1118 granted by the Commission to plaintiff. The situation created, therefore, is that although
the Commission determined in 1955 that all elements of convenience and necessity were present
entitling plaintiff to an award .of Certificate No. 1118
to provide service in San Juan County, the Commission has now determined, in a proceeding not involving the issue, that such Certificate is not sufficient
and plaintiff must obtain additional authority to
provide service anywhere in that County.
The Commissi.on's action in decertificating
plaintiff in San Juan County, as aforesaid, is erroneous and unlawful and contrary to Utah law. Section 54-7-13, Utah Code Ann. 1953 provides:
"The Commission may at any time, upon notice to the public utility affected and after
opportunity to be heard as pr.ovided in the
case of complaints, rescind, alter or amend
any order or decision made by it. Any order
rescinding, altering or amending a prior order or decision shall, when served upon the
public utility affected, have the same effect as
is herein provided for .original orders or decisions."
The terms of the Report and Order in the instant proceeding clearly "rescinds, alters or amends"
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the prior Order of the Commission in granting Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1118 to
plaintiff.
The necessity for providing due notice and
hearing in matters involving rescission or revocation of a utility's certificated rights was succinctly
stated by the Arizona Su9reme Court in Application
of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc., 92 Ariz. 173, 377
P. 2d 309 t1962l.
The applicable Arizona statute, 40-252, Ariz.
Revised Statutes, is virtually identical to that of
Utah quoted above, and the Court i:here stated:
"Quite aside from statutory requirements the
rescission or revocation of all or a portion of
a certificate of public convenience and necessity requires strict compliance with the procedural prerequisites of notice and hearing.
The Commission's power to grant, amend or
cancel certificates of convenience and necessity is limited to that expressly granted by
the Constitution and laws of Arizona."
Aside from the lack of statutory procedural requirements to enable the Commission to rescind,
alter or amend plaintiff's existing certificated
as noted above, the rule is well defined that a showing must be ma<le before modifying any establishe<l
lights that the certificated utilitv is unable or unwilling to meet its utility obligation in its certifirated area or that existing service is otherwise inadequate. Among the manv cases which have pro10

11ounced this rule are Salt f,ake Transfer Company v.
Public Seruice Commission, 11 Utah 2d 121; 355 P. 2d
706 ( 1960); Idaho Power & Light Company v. Blomquist, 26 Ida. 222, 141 P.1083 <1914); Peoples Telephone Exchange v. Public Service Commission, 186
S.W. 2d 531 (Mo.); Denver &: Rio Grande Western
nailror.d Company v. Public Utilities Commission
of the State of Colorado, 351 P.2d 278 (1960), and
Ephraim Freightways, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 380 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1963). The controversies in these cases involve specific areas or
routes and the right to provide service in such areas
or over such routes as between competing carriers
or utilities. The effect of prior certificated rights was
therefore properly at issue as a basic element of the
case. In the instant proceeding plaintiff's certificated
area, pursuant to its franchise and Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, is San Juan County. The
area in question, that sought by Empire, is only a
portion of the County. Service to the vast remaining areas of the County was not an issue before the
Commission but, as noted hereinabove, the Commission nevertheless erroneously undertook to determine plaintiff's rights under its existing, longstanding Certificate, not only in the area sought by
Empire but in all of San Juan County. The burden
is thereby wrongfully imposed on plaintiff, compelling it to obtain additional certificates of convenience and necessity from the Commission, disregarding the authority granted under Certificate No. 1118,
in order to serve San Juan County even in an area
11

that may be contiguous to its own lines and far removed from that certificated to Empire.
A decision of this Cow·t in a carrier case mvolved an issue, among others, analogous to the question presented on this appeal. In that case W. S.
Hatch Co. l'. Public Seruice Commission of Utah,
et al., 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (1954>, Hatch applied for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
to transport acids throughout the State. Guy Prichard appeared as a protestant claiming that a certificate previously issued to him included rights to haul
acid in several counties which would result in a duplication of service in those counties if Hatch was
also certificated therein. There was some question
regarding Prichard's authority to haul aci<l under
the wording of the certificate granted to him several
years prior to the controversy. The Commission acknowledged that it had serious doubts whether or
not his authority did in fact include the right to
transport acids, but the Commission nevertheless
determined that such right was included in his authority'. Batch's application was therefore denied.
This Court set aside the Commission's Order and
determined that Prichard's certificate did not include authority to haul acid. Regarding that issue
of the case, the Court stated at Page 811:
"The interpretation of the Certificate presents
a question of law only. The extent of Prichard 's authority must be as found within the
four corners of the Certificate and the rights
thereunder must be such as are fairly under-

stood from the import of its language. Unless
there is some uncertainty or ambiguity in the
Certificate there is no basis for interpretation
or clarification. Operating rights may not be
extended by interpretation, and Prichard's
authority could not be augmented in this proceeding wherein he appeared only as a protestant."
The Court's reasoning in the Hatch case is equally applicable to the instant proceeding. The conclusion is apparent that if Prichard's operating rights
could not be extended by interpretation and his authority could not be augmented in a proceeding
wherein he appeared as a protestant, then likewise
plaintiff's rights herein could not be reduced by interpretation and its existing authority could not be
restricted in this proceeding wherein plaintiff appeared only as a protestant.
Plaintiff did not have notice that any issue affecting its County-wide certificated rights would be
considered and determined by the Commission in
Empire's certificate application hearing and plaintiff did not have an opportunity to be heard thereon, contrary to decisions of this Court and the provisions of the Utah statute quoted hereinabove.
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POINT II
THAT THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND
ORDER HAS UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED
PLAINTIFF OF A VALUABLE PROPERTY
RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ST A TES,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STA TE OF
UT AH, AND UT AH LAW.
The principle is well established that a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is a valuable
property right. It is equally well established that the
owner of such a Certificate cannot be <leprived of
same without due process of law. The protection of
such property right is, of course, guaranteerl by the
Constitution of the Unite<l States, Amen<lment XIV,
Section 1. and by the Constitution of the State of
Utah, Article I. Section 7, the "due process'' provisions.
Two recent decisions of the Colorado Supreme
Court in cases involving utilities adhere to this priuciple. Although not involving factual situations identical to the instant case, the question of due process
afforded a certificate holder was a paramount issue
in both cases. In Mountain View Electric Association,
Inc. P. Public Uti!Wes Commission of Colorado, 446 P.
2d 424 ( 1968), Mountain View, a cooperative association, applied for and received in 1958 a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity authorizing it to supply electric service to consumers in an area near Colorado Springs. The City of Colorado Springs in 1C)41
14

i

I

-had applied for and received a Certificate of Convenjence and Necessity authorizing it to supply electric service to certain territory outside its city limits,
including a portion of the area later certificated to
Moun
View. Thereafter a territorial dispute occwTed between the cooperative and the City culmim1 ting in a proceeding before the Commission, instigated by Mountain View, wherein it sought an
Order from the Commission directing the City to
,·emove its facilities within the area certificated to
Mountain View. The hearing resulted in an Order
which deleted from Mountain View's service territory that area that had previously been certificated
to the City. In upholding that Order, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, Page 466, stated:

"A certificate of public convenience and necessity is a property right which cannot be
taken from the owner without due process of
law."
Regarding the matter of notice, the Court concluded at page 467:
"The record discloses that at no time did the
commission or Colorado Springs have reason
to believe that the removal of the disputed
territory from the certificate of Colorado
Springs was involved, and therefore no notice was given in respect to such an issue; nor
was evidence adduced to support such a finding; nor was such a finding of fact ever made."
A subsequent decision by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Public Utilities Commission of Colorado v.

15

(;rand 1 ·a/fe_i· Rural />011 l'r i,incs, Inc., +·J.I t-'.2d 21

( 1968 ! , also involved the due process issue. In that
case Public Service Co. of Colorado constructed an 0xtension to provide electric service to a new motel.
(-;rnnd Valley filed a complaint alleging that such extension was unlawfully const1ucted. The certificate
of Public Service Co., granted in 1946, authorized it
to make extensions to its present lines except where
such extensions would conflict with the rights of
Grand Valley serving designated rural areas, but
even in that instance Public Service could extend
to serve any customer whose needs were in exces'
of 100 kilowatts and such customers were to be ex·
elusively served by Public Service. The motel re- !
quirements were in excess of 100 kilowatts. The Colorado Commission held that the extension had been
lawfully made. Grand Valley attacked this decision
on the complaint, among others, that the Commission "could not have intended th0 1946 certificate
to grant Public Service a permanent right to sene '
those customers vvith greater than a 100 kilowatt
need, especially in light of tlw changed conditions ,
smce 1946." Regarding this contention. the Court
stated at Page 28:
"Grand Valley cites no authority, and we are
not aware of any, that a portion of the order
of thE- Commission becomes unlawful by the
mere operation of time. It must be remembered that the proceeding before the
sion was not one to reopen the decision granting the 1946 certificate. Since rights granted
under a certificate of authority are property
rights. due process requires a full hearing if
16

anything granted m the certificate is to be
taken away."
Another interpretation of the vested property
right of an existing certificate holder was set forth
by the Arizona Supreme Court in Application of Trico Electric Cooperative, Inc., supra. That case involvP<l conflicting service areas of Trico, a cooperative,
and Tucson Gas and Electric. Trico entered into a
contract with a subdivider to supply electric service
to a new development and commenced a proceeding to have the contract approved by the Arizona
Corporation Commission. Trico was authorized to
serve the subject area under its certificate. Prior to
the hearing, Tucson extended its lines into the area
to be subdivided. At the hearing the Commission
disapproved the cooperative's contract and, in a consoli<lated proceeding pending before the Commission involving conflicting applications of the two
utilities, it established the respective operating areas
of each and issued amended certificates of convenience and necessity to each. The area involved in
Trico's contract with the subdivider was deleted from
Trico's area and awarded to Tucson. The Court, in
determining that the Commission had exceeded its
authoritv. said at Page 315:
"In the performance of its duties with respect
to public service corporations the Commission
acts as an agency of the State. By the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity to a public service corporation the State
in effect contracts that if the certificate holder will make adequate investment and render
17

competent and adequate :->ervice, he may havP
the privilege of a monopoiy as against any other private utilit_y. Trico's r·ight to maintain
its distribution lines in the area of its certificate, and to make ex tensions therefrom to customers resulting from the development of the
area served by it is a vested property right protected by (the constitution)."
Another case of significance is that of Public
Service Company of Colorado 1·. Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, 350 P.2d '543 ( 1960 J,
commonly known as the "Union Case." This case
involved a cooperative, Union, seeking to displace
existing certificated utilities within the coopcrative's
service area and to itself obtain a certificate for the
area. This decision contains an informative review
of a typical situation. common to Utah utilities as
well as thosc of Colorado, regarding the background.
development, and growth of an REA-financed cooperative and the sub.;;equcnt conflicts that arose between the established regulated public utilities an cl
cooperatives when the latter acquired the same regulated status. Union's lines, prior to becoming a regulated utility, paralleled many of the lines of the certificated utilities as well as extending beyond same
to serve sparsely populated areas. The Colorado Commission granted Union the certificate sought except
for some incorporated areas that were franchised and
certificated to others. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in part, affirmed the Commission's award to
Union of a certificate but only insofar as same
granted to lTnion authority to render service to it'
then members c.rnd customers. The Court, regardinp18

!

Lhe right of the investor-owned utilities to extend

their service into the Union area, said:
"Public Service and Central should be permitted to extend their lines in the area in order that they may perform their duty to the
public, utilize therr property for the purposes
to which it has for years been dedicated, and
vvithout restrictions by the PUC predicated on
alleged rights of Union claimed by it to have
been acquired during its operations prior to
gaining- public utility status.
"As a necessary corollary to the above, PUC
has no authority to grant to Union any rights
of extension in the area except upon application and proof of the fact that adequate service is not readily available from Public Service or Central and that public convenience
and necessity requires that Union render the
:-:ervice requested."
The Colorado Supreme Court further indicated
that the private utilities having at great expense
acquired valuable rights to serve the area in conformity with law and with approval of the PUC, the PUC
could not later deprive them of these rights or curtail or limit them in exercising their rights to extend and expand their services in the area so long
as such expansion did not impair or endanger service to others entitled to same.
The question of protection of prior certificated
rights was considered in still another Colorado case,
Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado
I'. Home Ught and Power Companv, 428 P.2d 928
19

Thie- case invol\'('ti il11 dJ1]lliullio11 10· <1 Cntificatc of Co11ve11ie11cc and N<'tTssily filed by Poudn'
\"a
Cooperative awl count c r a pplica tio11s tiled by
llome Light and Powe1· Company and Public
Service Company of Colorndo. Poudre \"alley (!]so
filed a formal complaint against the other two utilities. All matters involved the same disputed servicr
area and were thereforC' consoli<lated for hearing.
Among numerous issues involved \vas that of thr
1·ights of C'xisting certificate holders in the disputed
areas. In that regard, thP Colorado SuprPnH' Court
stated:
\l<J!J/

1 •

"But we feel constrained to note that once an
area has been certificated to one utility, it and
it alone has the right to serve the future needs
of that area provided it can do so. This is esse11 tial to the <loctrine of regulated monopoh·
in Colorado. See, Col.oi"aclo Tra11Sp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 1-'58 Colo. 136, 405 P.2d 682.
This does not mean, however, that Public Service (or any other utility) may not seek to
serve the user if it appeai·s in the future that
a certificated utility is either unwillin{{ or ur1able to serve any existing or newly developing
load (industrial or otherwise l vvithin its ce!·tificate<l teITitory at rates approved by the
P.TJ.C. See, Den.:er & R. G. V\T. R. R. v. Public
Util. Comm .. 142 Colo. 400, 3-J1 P.2d 278."
ThC' extent of plaintiff's "prnpertv right", inherent in its Certificate of f:onvPniPnce and Necessity
No. 1118, is evident from plaintiff's Exhibit 20
CR. 1()7) indirnting a total investment of nearlv $2 900,000 in electric facilities to provide service to c01120

m San Juan County. The testimony of Mr.
Boehmer (R. 286-7) and Mr. Shill <R. 298) related
i11 part to further facilities being constructed in San
Juan County to enable plaintiff to supply the future
electrical needs of consumers in that County. There
is no evidence in the record that plaintiff has failed
or refused to meet its utility obligation in San Juan
County. It is significant that no evidence was presented in that regard because the question .of plaintiff's right to provide electric service to consumers in
said County as a whole was not an issue in the instant proceeding.
It is apparent from the foregoing decisions,
among others, that the Courts readily recognize the
valuable property right inherent in a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity and the decisions are
clear that one cannot be deprived of such a right
without due process of law. The appearance by Utah
Power in this proceeding was solely as a protestant
to an application seeking authority involving electric
service in a portion of San Juan County. It had no
reason to believe that in such proceeding it would
be deprived of its long standing certificated rights
in the whole of said County. No notice was given in
respect t.o such an issue, no evidence was adduced in
that regard, and it did not have an opportunity to be
heard thereon. The essential elements of "due process" were clearly absent and there was no basis,
therefore, to warrant any determination by the Commission regarding the future exercise of Utah Power's
long standing certificated rights in San Juan County
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and particularly in the vast area of the County not
involved in Empire's application.

,

A final factor of significance is rhat the Commission's determination affecting plaintiff's existing
certificate rights not only deprives plaintiff of a valuable property right without clue process of la'<Y, but
is also inconsistent with the requirements of public
convenience and necessity. The Commission's 1955
award to plaintiff of Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 1118, authorizing the exercise of the
rights and privileges conferred by the San .Juan
County onlinance, was a determination by the Commission that public convenience and necessity warranted the granting of such Certificate. The certificate granted herein to Empfre does not authorize it
to supply' electric service to the general public in the
area mrnrded to it, but authorizes the supplying of
such service only to its members in that area. Consumers in such area who are not members of the
cooperative could not therefore be served by Empire
because of its limited franchise and certificate, and
likewise could not be served by plaintjff unless
plaintiff first secured additional certificate authority
as required bv the Commission's Report and Order.
Such result does not serve the public's convenience
and lleCPssitv but. on the contrarv. obstructs it. Plaintiff submits that its existing- authoritv should properly Pntitle it, as the only' certificated "public" utility' in San Juan County. to servp any consumer in
that County· <lesirin7 its service. aml this authoritY
shoulrl Rpplv even in the Rrec:i c:iwar<lecl to Ernpirr

22

I

-if a consumer therein desit-es electric service but de-

termines for any reason that he does not choose to
twrnme a member of the cooperative.
CONCLUSION
The Report and Order of the Commission has
erroneously altered and adversely affected plaintiff's prior certificated rights in San Juan County and
those areas thereof not in controversy in this proceeding; such action on the part of the Commission
has deprived plaintiff of a valuable property right
without due process of law and is arbitrary, capricious and contrary to the provisions of Utah law and
the Constitutions of the United States and the State
of Utah and should therefore be annulled, vacated,
and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
SIDNEY G. BAUCOM
ROBERT GORDON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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